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January 29, 2004

Hutton's verdict

My reticence yesterday over the Hutton Inquiry was due not to the intractability of the issues but to my being stranded by the weather. But I reflected that for those of us who for months had been criticising the BBC and supporting the Government it would be easy and tempting merely to pronounce victory, to crow smugly and to damn the BBC.

So I shall do all of those things.

Last July I wrote:

The implications for the BBC's credibility as a public-service news broadcaster are so disturbing that it's unsurprising that the corporation's own coverage of Dr Kelly's tragic suicide should verge on the coy. According to its political correspondent Nick Assinder:

"[T]he long term effects of this tragedy must surely be to force all those who participate in politics to look long and hard at their behaviour. It raises numerous questions about openness, responsibility, trust and even morality. And there can be no more powerful a case for a new compact between the public and those who are elected to serve it. It is now unthinkable that, once this horror has passed, we will all simply go back to our old ways."

The pronoun in the final clause does not appear to refer at any point to Assinder's own employer or colleagues. I should be surprised if that incorrigible, insufferable assumption of superior insight and purity of motive were not a casualty of Lord Hutton's inquiry.

A few days later I wrote:

The BBC's credibility has been destroyed not because a particular politician says so but because of the way the corporation has behaved. It broadcast sensational allegations that its source did not recognise. It misrepresented the nature of its source, claiming he was from the intelligence services, thereby evading the need for further substantiation of its correspondent Andrew Gilligan's claims. These are violations of basic professional ethics, never mind of the ethos of public service broadcasting.

[Andrew] Marr must know this, because he's an experienced and scrupulous journalist. Yet he concludes with the feeble observation that:

"I don't think that when this inquiry finally reports, probably in September, anybody - BBC, journalists, or the government or spin doctors - are [sic] going to walk away from this claiming a great political defeat, a great political victory."

Of course no one will claim a great political victory: the issue is more important than politics. A man has died, by his own hand; the Hutton inquiry has been established to find out why. What we can already say for certain would still hold were Dr Kelly alive today, and does hold regardless of its salience for the inquiry into his death. The BBC's output of news and current affairs is in chaos; it lacks adequate controls; it is consistently ill-informed; certain of its correspondents are frankly ignorant of the subjects they're supposed to specialise in; it is sentimental rather than analytical; it introduces - not even covertly, for its practitioners know of no other way of making sense of the world - a bias that treats pressure groups as invariably disinterested and political authority as deceitful; and it reports on the security policies of western democracies, specifically the United States and Israel, as if no terrorist threat existed and these countries' military actions were evidence of malign intent rather than defensive necessity.

In September I wrote:

Andrew Gilligan's priming the Foreign Affairs Committee with questions for Dr Kelly was not merely an embarrassment: it was an abuse of privileged sources and professional responsibilities. So far from his original report's having been well-sourced, it was contradicted not only by the author of the government's dossier on Iraq's weapons, John Scarlett, but also by Gilligan's BBC colleague Susan Watts. The BBC Chairman, Gavyn Davies, failed to exercise management control of this loose cannon, or even to evidence interest in the subject at all till Alastair Campbell challenged the BBC on the veracity of its reporting. The obvious course for Davies would have been then to act on the suggestion of the prime minister that the BBC state that, while it stood by its right to broadcast the original Gilligan report, it now accepted the factual basis of that report to have been wrong. If Davies had done that he would have limited the damage to the corporation and upheld his reporters' right to exercise judgement, while taking the honourable and professionally-required course of correcting a serious mistake. Because none of us knows the reasons for Dr Kelly's suicide, I shan't speculate on what effect this would have had on his actions; it would simply have been right for Davies to acknowledge that the BBC had got itself into a position incompatible with its status as a public-service news organisation.

And I still erred on the side of the BBC. I considered Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon had shown so little interest and managerial competence in the running of his department and the welfare of his employee that I felt he should resign immediately. I am happy to place on record my having been unreasonably critical of the Government on this issue, and to correct my mistake.

Three issues remain: the character of the BBC’s response; the criticism of the Inquiry by self-interested parties; and the complexion of post-Hutton politics.

The resignations of the two most senior figures in the BBC’s management are welcome and honourable. The accompanying verbiage is not. Greg Dyke’s pre-recorded assertion yesterday that the BBC acknowledged errors and had taken remedial action bore the hallmarks of one who had no conception of the venality of the BBC’s conduct. These were not faults of administrative torpor or inefficiency: they were instances of professional misconduct compounded by an institutional abdication of responsibility to investigate grave and unfounded allegations. The moral evasion of the BBC management in insinuating that, while they resign, they do so having been more sinned against than sinning is an indication in itself of the unfitness of the BBC to be self-regulating or even to be taken seriously as a public-service broadcaster.

Those whose views on the issue have been moulded not by a disinterested consideration of the responsibilities of a public-sector organisation but a prior animus against the Government for having overthrown the world’s worst tyrant have been left with little to do except cry foul. Their animadversion is neither convincing nor elevated. As Professor Norman Geras rightly observes:

[M]ost of the whitewash stuff is being produced by whom? Why, by journalists for liberal, anti-war media. Have you read even one of these who has acknowledged that there might be a problem with substituting his or her perception of the issues for Lord Hutton's over a matter on which they have at least two strong reasons for being partisan towards one side and against the other? I haven't. This relates, though, to a war which they vehemently opposed; and to findings against a media organization to which they are well-disposed and in favour of a government to which they aren't well-disposed. It's a bit of a caricature, but not too much of one, to suggest that this is like me coming before a judicial tribunal of some sort, and in which my own conduct is under scrutiny, and saying 'The hell with judge and tribunal. I can decide.'

The persistence of these underlying political presumptions is the only explanation I can adduce for the suspension of criticism of the BBC by those who would surely know better but for their anti-war position. The former BBC war correspondent and Independent MP Martin Bell, whom I revere but whose views on Iraq I have disagreed with for years, lamented in his political memoirs the death of “news as we had understood it and journalism as we had practised it”. Yet he now remarks in The Guardian:

Most people, even now, are more inclined to trust the BBC than the government – this one, or any other.

Well, I should hope so. The BBC is, after all, bound by its charter to be impartial. This Government, like any other, by definition has a political point of view. It’s because the BBC has taken on the functions of a political party, dispensing a view of the world that is tendentious and intellectually idle, that it’s got into this mess. Yesterday was not a disaster for good journalism: it was a prerequisite of restoring the best traditions of foreign journalism that used to be practised by BBC correspondents such as Kate Adie and Charles Wheeler and that has now been superseded by politically-loaded, sanctimonious, superficial, ill-informed and professionally improper ululating.

Finally, the politicians’ reception for Hutton was as revealing as the journalists’. When Michael Howard acceded to the Conservative leadership I was deliberately emollient in this blog, for I certainly wanted the Conservative Party to have a plausible and articulate leader in order to preserve the informal conventions of a two-party system. But I didn’t take this to an extreme: in response to a suggestion that progressive voters ought to vote tactically in Howard’s own constituency at the next election, I noted that while there was indeed a respectable case for voting tactically for Howard in order to defeat the Liberal Democrats, it would not be a course I myself would recommend.

But Howard’s handling of the two principal issues of this week has been unprincipled and even tawdry. To have opposed university top-up fees without having any policy to replace it with, to the detriment of university funding and personal responsibility, was philosophically chaotic and politically foolish. To have resurrected all the charges that Lord Hutton disposed of, and to have done it in the same speech in which he ostensibly accepted the findings of Lord Hutton, was beyond obtuseness: it was graceless opportunism that redounded to his lasting discredit.

That debate was a triumph for Tony Blair over two party leaders who are lesser men and less principled politicians. The quality of our democracy is the better for it.

Comments

As regards the BBC and the anti-war opposition, I believe Norman Geras and yourself have said it all.
Regarding Conservative critics of the government, from the standpoint of a centrist "liberal" who would like to see a coherent, competent and pricipled opposition.

Howard has mishandled this badly. (And so IMHO, has Boris Johnson and the Spectator, sadly). I have talked to several people of broadly Conservative political views, and all think Howard's (and IDS's) approach to Kelly/Hutton has been: sling mud, hope it sticks.
All think Howard should have made a short statement, slammed the Beeb, briefly admitted to over-enthusiasm in his earlier attacks, then sat down and shut up.
But, in the words of Vic Reeves: "He wouldn't let it lie!"
This comes on top of his position on student fees, and for that matter on restoring earnings linkage to state pensions.

The Conservatives continue to make the mistake they have made ever since their defeat in 1997: they believe that a Labour government is an affront to the proper order of things, Blair is some sort of duplicitous monster, the people must have been fooled to vote them in, and attacks on the integrity of Blair and his ministers are the key to undermining public support.
Whether or not this is true is beside the point. As politics it has not worked and is unlikely too. Without coherent, consistent and well thought out policies - not opportunistic populism - to engage Labour weakness (on education, local government, over-regulation, crime and judicial reform, for example) the Conservatives will fail.
Howard appeared to promise a new course for the Tories; he has blown his first opportunities to follow through. This is a blow not merely to his party (which worries me not at all) but to intelligent political discourse in Britain (which does).

(Gollum the ultra-Tory retires muttering: "He did lie! He did, he did. We hates him, we hates him so much! We should rule, my preciousss! Nassty, horrid New Labour...spin doctorsss...Tony's croniessss...")

Well, it’s been a long time coming but now it’s here; I disagree with you strongly for all that you *failed* to say in your post! I will explain my ‘Irish-ism’. I completely agree with the general thrust of your criticism of the BBC. Gilligan let his enthusiasm run away and his line management failed to check him. The strategic management then compounded the offence by rushing thoughtlessly to an automatic defence.

But not even you can convince me that Lord Hutton’s total, repeat, total clearance of *any* malpractice by the government is worth more than a bucket of spit! I supported the war and was dumbstruck in admiration of Tony Blair, a politician I had formerly dismissed as vacuous, for putting himself, his government and his party at risk in order to do what he believed passionately to be right.

But his (to use an ugly word) methodology in ‘selling’ his policy to the people, smacked of all the worst traits associated with Alistair Campbell and his rotten-to-the-core press office. Blair, by which I mean his office, defiled the JIC whose product should never be interfered with and if Greg Dyke has been forced to resign so should John Scarlett who was complicit. Gilligan was indubitably right in saying that the dossier was interfered with and this was confirmed in the evidence – words and meanings were changed. How Lord Hutton can gloss over this beats me and his line to the effect that Scarlett might have been influenced “sub-consciously” is an insult to everyone’s intelligence. Can you imagine Campbell influencing anyone “sub-consciously”? Hutton’s work makes the Widgery enquiry look intellectually respectable.

The final insult came with the leaking of the report itself which, natch!, No. 10 denies – and how often have we heard that one before? Actually there was one more ‘final’ insult and that was perhaps the hardest to bear: the sight and sound of Alistair Campbell strutting his sanctimonious stuff from studio to studio. This, from a man who has been the single most malign influence on public life in my lifetime. Pass the sick bag! I’m just surprised, Oliver, that with your ‘forensic’ analytical abilities you can’t see what that booby Hutton failed to see.

So David, what is your evidence for the government leaking the report?

The key issue about this affair is that trust in both the BBC and politicians has been harmed over this issue to the detriment of our democracy.

David, the government clearly had nothing to gain from leaking a report that cleared it in every respect. Far more likely is the idea being put forward that an employee from the Stationary Office publisher leaked the report.

Thankfully, Hutton never made mention of anyone "strutting his sanctimonious stuff" or a "rotten-to-the-core press office" - that really would have been bias on a monumental scale, wouldn't it?

Michael Howard acted correctly I believe, his point is: can what Tony Blair said to a journalist on a plane be reconciled with what the Hutton report revealed. The answer most would contend dare I say would be no. Hutton did not deal with this point.

However Michael Howard demonstrated on Wednesday during Prime Ministers Questions that he had clearly not read David Kay's Interim Progress Report which is simply unforgivable for the leader of the conservative party during this period.

And has it not occurred to anyone that certain high ranking members of our intelligence agencies were just as eager to go to war as Tony Blair? Why do we assume Mr. Blair and so on were the ones doing the influencing? Just a thought.

A point to make about the leaking of the report to The Sun: When it was leaked, everyone assumed that the Govt had done it because they wanted to spin the pro-Govt side of the story into the public domain before the inevitable criticisms followed 24 hours later. The fact that there *were* no substantial criticisms tends to shoot down that motivation for the story.

Anthony et al:-
I have no evidence, certainly none that would stand up in front of Lord Hutton. However, what I do have is common sense, not infallible but useful in a murky world.

The Downing St. press office had motive: the *first* headline is the *best* headline so make sure it's *your* headline. In addition it had the advantage of blowing the follow-up story of Blair's humiliation over University fees out of sight!

It certainly had the means: there are, I gather, plenty of young oilers working there only too eager to execute the merest hint from their anonymous bosses. Finally, they have plenty of form: the number of leaks that have emanated from No. 10 are legion, always vehemently denied but subsequently admitted when their lies are found out. As for the printers, I understand they were subject to rigorous security vetting and were searched on leaving the premises.

The whole imbroglio has caused immense damage to our country. Blair's pro-war policy was correct for all sorts of reasons that Oliver has elucidated so often and so well. However, the means he used to lead us, the country, into that war were foolish, panicky amd mendacious. But, and here I can't help shaking my head in sorrow, in a democracy we get the politicians we deserve. Our general population is now so thick and so wrapped up in hedonistic pleasures from which they do not wish to be disturbed that they are incapable of thinking through any sort of complicated situation.

This problem of an il-educated population goes right to the top. The heads of our intelligence services, if they had any sense of honour, should go the way of Davies and Dyke. They failed to get good quality intelligence and then failed to own up to their lack of knowledge. Instead, they accepted low-grade info and then failed to stand up to Campbell and Powell and their manipulative attempts to harden speculation into fact. The result is that for a generation or more the reports of the JIC will be worth about the same as a report from Lord Hutton, ie, bugger all! I really do fear for this country as a result.

Quite right David, even if I disagree slightly about whether it is the people's fault that we have the politicians we have or past politician's fault that we have the 'ill-educated' population. I actually think that contrary to what you say the Government's approach to selling the war has shown the public to be far less dumb than politicians give them credit. Large numbers of people opposed the war beforehand because they did not accept the specific case that the Government put for it (why should they have to read between the lines?) - and they are being proven more right as time goes on.
Despite that all the polls show that with hindsight we support the action that was taken, even if weapons are not found . There were good reasons for the war and, if the Government hadn't taken pre-conceived positions of what the public would accept and tried to spin the intelligence their way, there is every reason to think that they would have got the support they wanted beforehand. The 'tragedy' is that the dossiers and spinning probably only made things worse because people could see through them (in the same way as people will see through the Hutton report). It is easy to understand the motivation for some of the things the government did, but that won't help looking forward.

As you say the damage that could have been caused for the future is incalculable, and goes further than trust in our intelligence services - there must be an inquiry to try and re-establish that trust and, if necessary, heads should roll at the top of those organisations. There is an excellent article, worth reading IMO, on other implications (the Anglo-American alliance esp) in this weeks Spectator.

Just one word on the leaking of the report, to add to the debate.

I'm pretty certain where the leak came from, and it definitely wasn't No10.

The MOD?

I must say I never understood the government's obsession with WMDs. They should have, as Bush did in the US, made the case for regime cage based on the totality of Saddam's actions. By stressing the most sensationalist of these possible reasons with the 45 minute stance, they opened themselves up to this eventuality. It is really a case of putting all your eggs in one basket of spin.

I agree with all those who have said the Conservatives have totally blown it with this issue. I think Howard was appallingly bad this week and just looked like a total arse. It is pretty pathetic when the best line of the day came from a Labour backbencher. This week as been a major set-back for Howard. I hope that he has learned from his errors.

With Hutton Blair took a gamble and won, as did the BBC but they lost, big time. I must admit to have no sympathy to the BBC. It was good of Dyke to resign, too bad Gilligan doesn't have the stones to do the same.

This little story seems to demonstrate perfectly what Gilligan and his colleagues at the BBC don't understand about what role they're meant to be playing in Britain - http://news.scotsman.com/latest.cfm?id=2465551.

Though I'm an American, I've been following the Hutton inquiry very closely and have read the report. Accordingly, I fail to see any evidence supporting David Duff's claim that the intelligence dossier was "interferred with" and that "words and meanings" were changed in any significant way. Take the 45 minute issue Gilligan made the center of his allegation that it was "sexed up" by Number 10.. He said it was inserted into the dossier on the insistance of Campbell, supporting this with what Kelly purportedly told him and on the evidence that it didn't appear in the original draft. Well, Kelly denied he said anything of the sort, and we now know that the reason the 45 minute assertion wasn't in the first draft was that the intelligence services didn't receive that information from its source until shortly before the final report was issued.

David Duff assumes that Campbell, being Campbell, must have influenced Scarlett and others who prepared the dossier, and scoffs at Hutton for refusing to see what he so clearly does. But what is the evidence for his assertion, other than his belief that Campbell's personality and modus operandi in the past makes any other interpretation invalid. Duff is entitled to such a belief but let's label it for what it is: pure speculation devoid of any substantive evidence.

This is similar to the claims made by anti-war Democrats in the United States that the Bush Administration "cooked" the evidence that the CIA presented concerning Saddam's possession of WMD. This despite the fact that Hillary Clinton publicly said that every member of the Clinton security team she spoke to said the same thing as the Bush Administration. Moreover, former Pres. Clinton reportedly told the Prime Minister of Portugal that he was certain, from reading the intelligence that passed over his desk as president, that Saddam had an arsenal of WMD.

And just the other day, David Kay testified before a Senate Committee that every CIA analyist he spoke to denied that they were pressured to come to their conclusions that Iraq had WMD. No CIA analyist Kay interviewed -- and he spoke to virtually every expert on the subject of Iraq's WMD in the CIA -- supported Sen. Kennedy's accusation that the WMD intelligence was "manipulated."

Yes, the CIA, British intelligence, the French, the Germans, and even the Russians, all believed that Saddam possessed WMD, and they all got it wrong. Why they all got it wrong is an interesting question that will be analyzed and discussed for many years to come, but where is the evidence that the political leaders in Great Britain and the United States "constructed" those intelligence findings or, as David Duff put it, "hardened those speculations into fact," as if intelligence is ever closed to varying interpretations. But when all intelligence services worldwide come to the same conclusion, it is hardly irresponsible to believe in certain speculations as facts, as Bush and Blair did in the case of Iraq. For those interested in how intelligience, even the best intelligence, the most "factual" intelligence, such as the United States possessed prior to Pearl Harbor as a result of breaking the Japanese diplomatic code, can be misinterpreted, they should read Roberta Wohlstetter's classic study, "Pearl Harbor, Warning and Decision."

Jerry,
With respect I think you are confusing two seperate threads in this sorry tale.

1: I agree that the international intelligence community were all in agreement that Iraq had WMDs.
2: I agree that it would have been a dereliction of duty for a politician to fail to act on such intelligence.

But it is my contention *supported by testimony given to Hutton* that Blair and his team panicked and insisted/pressured/persuaded/hinted (choose your own word) that the JIC report be strengthened. Campbell (I heard the extract repeated on radio just today) admitted to making 16 points along these lines, and Powell sent an e-mail insisting that a phrase to the effect that Saddam might use his WMDs as a last defence be removed.

My point is that NOT ONE SINGLE COMMA LET ALONE A WORD OR PHRASE SHOULD EVER BE CHANGED ON A JIC REPORT - NOT EVER! In fact it was against all precedent that a JIC report should even have entered the public arena in the first place (we do things differently over here!)

The reason I think this is so important is that the intelligence people MUST always put their conclusions in THEIR words. The pols can then put their gloss on it and re-issue it as their own work if they wish. But that way, everyone knows who wrote what and who is responsible for what. Because Campbell and his crew (who produced that travesty of a first dossier which they lied about when they tried to pass it off as an intelligence brief) are so ignorant and/or contemptuous of well-tried and tested procedures, they have muddied the waters and left us all feeling we were tricked and, worst of all, from now on, no-one will trust a JIC report again.

I was, and still am, wholly in favour of the war but I am sickened by Blair and Campbell's shifty, mendacious practices. The apparent fact that all our intelligence outfits got it wrong does not surprise me and such a public blunder will at least warn politicians not to rely on experts but to use their judgement.

Despite all the words, I am still at a loss as to why Dr Kelly thought that his position was so desperate that his only option was to take his own life.

And already the Government are spinning the Hutton inquiry in their favour; you would think they'd take what they'd got.

Lord Falconer on Channel 4 news claiming that Hutton completely exonerated them of any wrongdoing in the compilation of the dossier, to the extent that their didn't even need any questions to be asked.
That was an issue that was taken by Hutton as specifically beyond his terms of reference. He recognised that the 6.07 broadcast was incorrect (government knowingly inserted inaccurate information) , but whilst acknowledging that the Government did 'sex-up' the dossier under one interpretation, saw it as beyond his terms to pass judgement on whether that was justifiable.

From over here in Silicon Valley the thing that gets me is that if before the Hutton report was published, you had done a poll and asked people if they thought Hutton was an honourable man or not, I'll bet you that the vast majority would have answered - yes.

Now Hutton is closer to this issue than anyone I know and he produced his report. I disagree with him not criticising the govt for things I believe he should have but I am not moaning about it. He was asked to do a thankless job, he did it, and as a result his reputation has been sullied by the very people who felt compelled to resign over their handling of this issue.

David:

I understand your concern about tampering with intelligence reports but offering suggestions about words, paragraphing, grammar, etc., hardly constitutes a crime. Lord Hutton thinks Campbell's suggestions were justified and didn't touch on the substance, facts, or interpretations of those facts in the JIC report and I agree with him. Scarlett testified that Campbell's suggestions were innocuous, and unless you have evidence that proves otherwise -- that is, evidence besides your conviction that Campbell is a loathsome creature -- I see no reason to condemn the Blair government on this issue. And the reason Campbell wanted to vet the JIC report in the way he did, is precisely because it was being made public. A public document, after all, should be clear and precise, and especially in this case when Great Britain was preparing to go to war because of the very intelligence the report contained. Not to clarify the intelligence, not to make the JIC report readable and understandable, would have been a dereliction of duty, I believe. Your fundamentalist approach to writing intelligence reports might be correct in the abstract but Blair was faced with a real life situation, a situation in which the British public wanted to understand the reasons behind the decision Blair was asking Parliament to make.

Peter:

As to why Kelly thought suicide was his only option, neither Hutton nor anybody else will ever be able to know for sure. But some evidence in Hutton's report is highly suggestive. Kelly, as Hutton indicates, was a highly private individual -- a difficult person to help, as he put it -- who had a well earned reputation for rectitude which he took very seriously. But he had severely damaged that reputation -- and no doubt his job -- by his unauthorized interviews with Gilligan. In other words, he had violated Civil Service norms by not getting clearance before he spoke with Gilligan. But more importantly, he had been caught in lies of his own making. He testified before the Parliamentary Committee looking into the BBC/Blair matter that he had never spoken with Susan Watts of the BBC. He said the same to the Ministry of Defense. What he didn't know or forgot at the time was that his Watts interview had been recorded. The pressure he was already under as a result of being caught up in the Gilligan Affair was now compounded by the disgrace he was bound to face when his interview with Watts became public. Just think of the tabloid headlines that were bound to follow: "Kelly lied to Parliament," etc. etc. To a rational scientist who prized his privacy and reputation, suicide might have seemed the lesser extreme than public ridicule.

To try to divorce this from all the pre-existing partisanship and emotion --

If a news body in America was found to have reported an unfounded fact, hammered on it against the goverment for months, failed to investigate vigorous denials of its authenticity and instead just blindly defended its reportage, then was found to be in the wrong on all of it, few would be supporting it, least of all other journalists.

What's all this crap about the end of free speech and aggressive journalism. This is about reporting the facts and management oversight that assures it. From over here, it appears that the lefty media is asserting their right to report fact as they wish them to be not as they are.

Caught in the middle is the public who seem to have way too much emotionally invested in the BBC. Pity.

There but for the grace of God go Bob Woodward and Bernstein...

The whole story was NOT wrong that was the point. The unscripted 6.07 broadcast of the words '...probably knew it was false'. It was not 'hammered on for months', more like 1/2 an hour until the next broadcast. Alistair Campbell demanded the whole story be retracted. The BBC made a big mistake. They thought it was 'just another rant - clearly living in the US you do not know much about Alistair Campbell's rants. (in them you have the reason why so much of the media has an instinctive support for the BBC's position, even it has to be said some of its main competitors.) It should have apologised for 6.07 and stood by the rest. The course of history may well have been broadly the same and Blair might not be Prime Minister today.
I supported the war. I still do.

Richard,
Perhaps I missed something--or perhaps you did. After that brief report, Gilligan (BBC employee) wrote an even more accusatory and inflammatory piece for the Sunday papers, from where the whole thing took off into a media circus. And BBC, which originated the accusation, and could have stemmed the tide, refused not only to retract, but even to investigate. They stood by their man, and shifted the focus to their right to report, while attacking the government for defending itself. Now they paint themselves, and journalism, as victims.

That's the way it appears to me, in the US, whose journalists were accused by Davies of not doing their jobs. In fact, I find much to complain of in some of the reporting here, but I don't find that our journalists made anything like the bloopers of Gilligan and his ilk.

I suggest that a news organization that is supported by public funds should be subject to the same critical scrutiny as any government agency. The role of a public broadcaster requires hard questions and investigation, particularly though not exclusively of the government. That is not the same thing as pushing its own agenda. From here, I see the latter function, arising out of a sort of cultural blindness that devalues all contrary opinion. I know that many Americans share my view. Perhaps it's because, like Blair on the war, we were targets (and not solely for the BBC).

The response to Hutton confirms my prejudices about the BBC; they just don't get it. Noses in the air; feet of clay. That even those who have resigned still look outward for someone to blame, and that there is, still, no call for self-examination, is perhaps the saddest thing of all.

Jerry,Who leaked Dr Kelly's name,he did subsequently get hung out to dry by the Government?Certainly the Government has some moral culpability.If a civil servant violates the rules the procedure does not involve throwing them to the press.I am not interested in either the Government or the BBC I feel they both behaved despicably in the case of Dr Kelly

Yes alene you are right, the BBC made mistakes. But also consider this.
The Government dossier in question originally claimed that Saddam may be able to employ (battlefield) chemical and biological weapons within 45 mins. This was subsequently changed to Saddam is able to employ chemical and biological weapons within 45 mins. This was then picked up by the newspapers (due to the 'undue prominence' given in the dossier) and completely blown out of all proportion. Consider this (I'm told from the Sun(!) )

"Brits 45 mins from doom",

"British servicemen and tourists in Cyprus could be annihilated by germ warfare missiles launched by Iraq, it was revealed yesterday.

"They could thud into the Mediterranean island within 45 MINUTES of tyrant Saddam Hussein ordering an attack. And they could spread death and destruction through warheads carrying anthrax, mustard gas, sarin or ricin. The terrifying prospect was raised in Downing Street's dossier on Saddam's arsenal ..."

So the Government have been cleared of 'knowingly inserting intelligence they knew to be wrong into the dossier'. Even any dodgy wording they have managed to offload onto the Chairman of the JIS (who should be seriously considering his position IMO). But is that much different from the following charge, which seems on the face of it incontrovertible:

That the Government knowingly allowed a grossly false perception of Saddam's capability to be picked up by the media (from a clearly ambiguous statement), indeed by its 'favourite papers', without immediately making clear that misinterpretation and correcting it for the record.

Like I said I support the war. The scandal is that we may have to do something similar at some point in the future the government's actions have probably fatally compromised our ability to do so with any public support at all.

I'm somewhat of the "a curse on both your houses" school of thought regarding the Hutton inquiry.

Did the Government try to influence the wording of the dossier in an attempt to get public opinion to be more pro-war? I wouldn't be surprised; look at how much politicians these days use focus groups to figure out what words to use to describe their positions. But the fundamental question is whether the Blairites knew that what was going in the report was false. I have a feeling they probably believed it was true.

The BBC, on the other hand, was mendacious at best in its reporting. I don't think they had any real evidence that the Government was engaged in an attempt to mislead the British people, but made up that claim.

As for the 45 minute claim, I think the reason the Blairites made such a big deal out of the WMDs is that they felt it was their only chance to turn public opinion in their direction -- none of the other arguments the Bush administration has been using would have been accepted, and there was no way the BBC was going to accept *any* argument in favour of going to war. I'm convinced that if Saddam Hussein had flown a fighter plane over Tel Aviv and dropped a nuclear bomb on the city, Lies Doucet would have led off Newshour with an interview asking about the "root causes" that led Hussein to do such a thing.

The BBC are infested with bias and rotten to the core. And I think it's coloring their reporting greatly. Last August, when the Northeast US and Ontario had the big blackout (I was affected), the World Service had a report from their New York correspondent in which the word "chaos" was repeatedly used, including a wonderful quote about how "many people simply took the chaos in stride". Well, if they're taking things in stride, it's not chaos! But after this report, the Bush House folks switched to their correspondent in Toronto, and clearly phrased their report in a way that implied that not only was there no chaos in Toronto, but the Canadians knew how to handle such things better.

The only problem is, I was able to listen to the CBC on shortwave, as well as various NYC radio stations. New Yorkers and Torontonians handled the blackout equally well, with no chaos in either place. The BBC for all intents and purposes made up out of whole cloth the allegations of chaos in order to have a story that fit their anti-US bias.

So the Sun misconstrued a statement about battlefield readiness, and did a tabloid shreik. I agree, then, the government was at fault for not squelching that idea post-haste. How long was the response delayed? And yet, one sees, again, that the primary error is attributable, not to the government, but to an irresponsible press. Reading the notorious "45 minute claim" in context doesn't lead one to make the assumption made by the Sun; the same phrase was used by Bush and not misconstrued.

The Sun deserves criticism, as well, for pushing its agenda, but then, the Sun has neither the BBC's reputation for veracity and restraint, nor license fees to support it. The BBC would find any comparison of its journalistic standards to those of the Sun risible, yet it now defends itself by adopting a similarly loose standard.

I've been picking at another aspect of all this. The man who provided the intel about battlefield WMD in 45 minutes was, in fact, a reliable source, who believed what he said and was in a position to know. Coupled with Kay's findings since, that appears to indicate that even good human intelligence is worthless in the face of self-deception, confusion and disinformation in the regime one is trying to evaluate. I don't lay this failure at the feet of either the government or the intelligence agencies. More, since it was Hussein who constructed this Potemkin Village of WMD, deceiving his own field command, it's hardly surprising that everyone in the intelligence services, and their governments, were deceived as well.

Thanks to all for their thoughtful comments.

I would like to add mine.

The transmission of intragovernmental and extrageovernemental intelligence information has always been subject to intense review and revision by multiple parties.

It is not guaranteed that the authors' names will be put on original intelligence analyses or summaries (often the section chief's name will be placed.) For a glimpse into this world I suggest reading Richard Pipes' memoir Vixi, where Dr. Pipes describes his experience as the Eastern Europe and Russian Desk Chief at the NSC under President Reagan.

Richard:

I have spent time this weekend reading Lord Hutton's report, perhaps you have too. You may be interested in reading the section on the 45-minute claim. It appears the change from "may" to "is" was predicated on the formulation of the original intelligence evidence which found no uncertainty as to the veracity of the intelligence finding, and hence the change was made. Here:

Q. If you do go back you do not just look at the raw intelligence, you look at how it was assessed; and it was assessed as "indicates", not "shows". Why does it therefore get put up to "are" if you are implementing this agreement?

A. The 9th September assessment that intelligence indicates that chemical and biological munitions could be with military units and ready for firing within 20 to 45 minutes - that was the wording, the sense of which was accurately reflected in the redrafting on the 17th September of the dossier. That is the point I am making. They went back to the intelligence, the original intelligence, which contained no caveat of uncertainty. They went back to the way in which it was phrased in the 9th September assessment and they redrafted their main body of the dossier to come into line with that, which it had not been before, including the words "intelligence indicates that."

Q. You say there was no element of uncertainty in this intelligence?

A. Report, yes.

The Hutton Report is exhaustive, nuanced, and exceedingly impartial. He took great pains to allow all the evidence to be brought forth, commented upon, and finally adjuicated. His ending of the report with a tribute to Dr. Kelly's heroism was especially cogent.

It's all very difficult MeTooThen, because at the end of the day when it comes to this specific question (why was 'may' changed to 'can') there is only the evidence of those on the JIC (and tangentially in Downing Street) to go on.

The explanation given in the report in perfectly logical given the evidence that was presented. However the evidence in Hutton only provides one side of the story - why it was that the wording was changed from 'may be able' to 'can be able'. There is I think no explanation as to why 'may' was included originally.
I just give one thought which is equally logical (especially given what we do know about unease in certain elements of the Intelligence establishment).

Suppose the 'may' appeared in the first draft, not because it represented any uncertainty on behalf of the source (the 'original intelligence evidence') , but because it represented uncertainty of those who filtered the intelligence (they didn't think it was reliable and it seems increasingly likely that they will be proven right). The claim was nevertheless included in the draft because the Government was desperate for anything which might help their case.

So the process is thus :

1)Source provides evidence "Iraq can fire weapons in 45 minutes"

2)Evidence is thought to be potentially unreliable so is filtered through as "Iraq may be able to..."

[This is speculation as I don't know how the Intell. services work but it would be reasonable to assume that it would in the normal course of events have been put in a box marked 'requires further corroboration']

3)In the fevered atmosphere of haste to get the dossier out, serious errors of process are made when the Govt queries the strength of the claim and the original source material is placed straight into the dossier as if part 2) never happened.

If such a scenario is accepted, and Hutton in no way even considers it let alone rules it out it seems the Govt can not be directly blamed other than it suggests that the whole concept of the Dossier, as carried out, was a very bad idea.

However the key point, which is why an Inquiry is so important is that clearly some serious questions would have to be asked of the JIC and the checks and balances procedures in the intelligence services when they are put under serious time pressure (such as might ordinarily arise in time of war)

Richard,

Your thoughtful comments are appreciated.

Neither do I know how the intelligence services work. We glean knowledge as to their workings through inquiries such as this as well as through memoirs as noted above.

One cannot speculate as to the outcome of the scenario in which you present, as it too is purely speculative. The facts as laid out in the Hutton report are just that, the facts. Nowhere did HMG pressure the JIC or others to make claims not substantiated by available intelligence. Lord Hutton makes this clear in his summaries. Nor is there evidence that haste played a role in the ultimate wording of the dossier in question. This does not mean that attempts weren't made to use the intelligence to persuade. This is part and parcel of extragovernmental transmission of intelligence. But nowhere, repeat nowhere, does Lord Hutton find that HMG acted improperly.

One additional point, there have been many crying that the Hutton report failed because the WMD have not yet been found and therefore, HMG did lie (as Bush lied)! That the intelligence may proven incorrect is to conflate being wrong with lying. I seriously hope that those who foment this conflation think carefully about the dangerous precedent they hope to make with these claims.

As to the safeguards you seek, there are sufficient checks and balances in place to vet intelligence and its dissemination. The most powerful check is of course the ballot. This is something that was not honestly afforded to the Iraqis, but has been to you and me. The UK and US voting public will have their say as to the performance of their respective leaders.

Kelly was murdered by the government

http://www.guardian.co.uk/letters/story/0,3604,1146025,00.html

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