Israel and Hamas
I spent the past week in Israel, and had the good fortune, with a few other British writers and journalists, to speak with some of the most senior political figures on both the Israeli and the Palestinian sides. (Our interlocutors' briefings were conducted unattributably, so I am unable to name them or quote them directly.) They were aware of the likely strength of Hamas in the Palestinian elections. Though all (barring Likud) wished for a two-state territorial settlement, none believed it likely in the near future. Their realism was well-placed. My reading of the situation after the Palestinian elections remains as I wrote it a few months ago when Israel withdrew from Gaza:
The dispiriting fact is that no negotiated two-state agreement is likely in the near future. Western commentators who speak of a two-state “solution” adopt a misnomer. A two-state arrangement, with Israel withdrawing to boundaries approximating the pre-1967 armistice line, is not a solution to the conflict, but an outcome of the end of the conflict. The end of the conflict requires something more deep-rooted: a changed relationship and mutual trust between Israelis and Palestinians.
That changed relationship will take time, on any likely reckoning. In the meantime, Israel is likely to continue to pursue a twin-track policy, even with the inevitability of Prime Minister Sharon's departure. (Since the fomation of Kadima and the resignation of Labour and Likud ministers, this is the first government for many years to comprise members of only one party. The ministers in the interim government include some impressive figures, notably the acting Foreign Minister, Tzipi Livni. I'm hopeful that Kadima will prosper even without Sharon - though in the short term Hamas's victory will certainly cause Israeli electoral opinion to shift towards Benjamin Netanyahu, the Chairman of Likud and former Prime Minister, who resigned from Sharon's government over Gaza.)
Those policies will comprise defensive deterrence (symbolised by the security barrier, commonly miscalled a 'wall' even though almost all of it is a wire fence), which has sharply reduced the number of suicide bombings against Israeli civilians; and declaratory policy of an end to the occupation of the West Bank, consequent upon the Palestinian Authority's defeating and disarming terrorist groups. With a PA under the rule of one such group, only actions and not words can be taken as evidence of that good intent. European governments should accept that that is the limit of Israel's room for manoeuvre; she is not able to declare peace unilaterally. Writing earlier this week, Dennis Ross, America's principal negotiator under three Presidents, summarised the prerequisites of progress towards a Middle East peace:
• First, that the international community will not deal with Hamas unless it renounces violence, gives up its weapons and commits to co-existence. (Presently, most Palestinians assume there is no cost to voting for Hamas; they need to understand that there are political and economic ramifications for empowering a terrorist organization.)• Second, that international assistance will be immediately forthcoming for job-creating projects but will cease if Palestinians do not immediately establish law and order in Gaza and the West Bank.
• And third, that continuing assistance to the Palestinian Authority will depend on its assumption of its real governing responsibilities, including a sustained effort to prevent acts of terror against Israel.
Hamas and the Palestinian Authority cannot have it both ways; it cannot be acceptable for Hamas to go along with law and order internally while it still tolerates and supports terrorism against Israel. Without such a clear-cut set of conditions and unmistakable international attention, the militarization of Palestinian society will intensify, affect the Israeli elections adversely, and point the way to a grim future.
I'm afraid this is right. Avoiding that grim future requires a long-term strategy.
