I posted a comment a couple of weeks ago pointing to the oddity of anti-war campaigners' attacking President Truman over the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagaski. I explained in the post why, if I were an opponent of Tony Blair's foreign policies, I would avoid any such arguments, for fear of confirming the claim made by interventionists that current Anglo-American policies stand in an established tradition of liberal democratic internationalism and anti-totalitarianism. I haven't yet written the follow-up post on why the historical claims made by the critics of Truman are wrong, but will do so shortly. This post is indirectly connected to the subject, and is prompted by my noticing (through Stephen Pollard) that the Barbican Centre in London is holding a John Pilger Film Festival this month.
There is a widespread view that, while Pilger's political judgements of recent years are not to be taken seriously (for example his assertion in 2003 that "the current American elite is the Third Reich of our times"), his earlier documentary films remain an important as well as impassioned source of social criticism. I've seen a fair amount of Pilger's work, and I don't agree with this. His films are loaded and flawed; his political judgements are histrionic; his research is nugatory. These are longstanding characteristics.
Pilger's best known work is his reporting from Cambodia in the late 1970s, depicting the horrific consequences of Pol Pot's despotism. I recall watching this at the time, and finding excruciating Pilger's account of these depravities. Yet there was something wrong - or rather, something missing. It was picked up by Clive James, then television critic of The Observer, whose account I'll quote at length because - always an astute and informed commentator as well as critic - he got Pilger's methods exactly right. In The Observer, 4 November 1979 (and included in his collected television criticism The Crystal Bucket, 1981, p. 228), James reviewed Pilger's film Cambodia: Year Zero. James commended Pilger's showing the hideousness of Pol Pot's crimes, but added:
Nevertheless, Pilger might have found a few unkind things to say about the North Vietnamese, who, I seem to remember, have recently taken to offering their internal enemies the opportunity of going on long yachting expeditions with insufficient regard to safety precautions [these were the 'Boat People']. Pilger loudly accused the international relief organisations of playing politics, but forgot to mention the possibility that the North Vietnamese might be playing politics themselves. The way he was telling it, they were philanthropists. He was there and we were here, but it was hard to quell the suspicion that one of the reasons he was there was that North Vietnam likes the way he presents such a neat, easily understandable picture.
With generosity and understatement, James identified the hollowness even of Pilger's most celebrated work. His point about the Vietnamese was confirmed by those who, unlike James, were there rather than here, such as the journalist and author William Shawcross. A year later, Pilger's follow-up programme Cambodia: Year One was broadcast. Clive James commented in his Observer column on 14 September 1980 (reprinted in his collected criticism Glued to the Box, 1983, pp. 116-7):
In Cambodia: Year Zero Pilger claimed that the North Vietnamese wanted to help the Cambodians but that aid from Western relief agencies was tardy. In my review of the programme I said that there seemed to be a lot of independent evidence to suggest that the Western relief agencies were being denied access to Cambodia by the North Vietnamese. Pilger wrote a letter to the Observer calling me a McCarthyite for saying this, but in fact subsequent evidence proved that he had indeed been wrong on this very point.
However well the North Vietnamese are behaving now - and apparently they are behaving so well that Pilger deems it tactless to mention the Boat People - there can no longer be much doubt that they were obstructive then. Yet for some reason Pilger can't bring himself to modify his account of the past. Does this obstinacy spring from pride at being the man on the spot, or is he afraid that a full picture of reality will be too complicated for us to grasp?
Even in Pilger's most highly regarded and influential work, the essential qualities shine through. His acounts are partial or unreliable; when their deficiencies are pointed out, his response is to bluster. Imagine - if you haven't seen it - what the rest of his output is like. Of those films I've seen, the worst of the worst is The Truth Game, screened in 1983 at the zenith of the influence of Europe's anti-nuclear movement. I'm disappointed this isn't being shown in the Barbican's season, as I would like to see it again. From what I recall, its production values were low, with Pilger's portentous insinuations of official deceit combining with the quaintest visual aids. But a more professional film would still have foundered on Pilger's message. In the words of Sir Lawrence Freedman (The Price of Peace: Living with the Nuclear Dilemma, 1986, p.13) The Truth Game was "a tendentious television documentary which had sought to demonstrate how mendacious governments were in handling nuclear issues but which was in fact riddled with errors of its own."
Pilger's thesis is relevant to my opening comments on Truman and the A-bomb because, like the campaigners I have quoted, Pilger dates the supposed mendacity of Western governments on the nuclear issue from the dawn of the nuclear age. It is a constant theme in his account of US foreign policy. For example, he wrote in the New Statesman, 18 August 2003:
The official truth was that the bomb was dropped to speed the surrender of Japan and save Allied lives. Today, as the public becomes more attuned to the scale of government deception, this was probably the biggest lie of all. As the historian Gar Alperovitz, among others, has documented, US political and military leaders, knowing that Japan's surrender was already under way, believed the atomic bombing was unnecessary.
In my next post on this issue, I'll demonstrate with reference to an overwhelming body of recent scholarship (some of whose authors I'm fortunate to count among my correspondents) that Pilger's historical claims are nonsense and his sources untrustworthy. (As one genuine scholar of the US and WWII, Robert Maddox of Pennsylvania State University, puts it in his Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision, 1995, p. 2, "despite the appearance of meticulous documentation [Alperovitz's work] was based on pervasive misrepresentations of the historical record".) But my point in this post is to demonstrate how Pilger reasons and the naïve way he arrives at his conclusions.
As it happens, The Truth Game received an appalled critical reception. Lawrence Freedman, then as now Professor of War Studies at King's College, London, and author of the standard account of The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, wrote with William Shawcross in the magazine New Society, 17 March 1983, a long account of the film's errors, entitled "Games with the Truth". If you have access to a library with back copies of the magazine (which has long since been submerged in The New Statesman), it's well worth reading the article and following the controversy it generated. (So far as I know there is no online version. The libraries I use are the London Library in St James Square and the University of London Library at Senate House, both of which have print copies.)
Freedman and Shawcross's article had to be long, because Pilger's errors were so serious and numerous. The authors concluded temperately:
In this article we have sought to examine only a few of the more startling errors in the 'unofficial truth' Pilger proposes. Not every assertion in The Truth Game is wrong. But so many are that it canot be treated as a serious analysis.
Pilger replied, intemperately, to Freedman and Shawcross in the next issue. The opening words of his article are, to my mind, an encapsulation of his method and limitations: "I would like to thank the many people who have written and phoned, offering me studies and sources...."
These, then, were "studies and sources" proffered after Pilger's film had been aired. Amazingly, Pilger regarded his thesis as a work in progress rather than as a conclusion to be inferred from scrutiny of the historical sources. Pilger's premise appeared to be that truth in this area could be determined by the extent to which people shared his political views rather than his fidelity to primary and scholarly secondary sources. He protested in his article that he had received many letters in response to the film, of which 900 were in favour and only three against: "With one exception," he announced, "we have never known such a positive response to a film." So, by Pilger's lights, that settled that one.
The damage was done. Despite having one further go, which merely compounded his difficulties, Pilger had disclosed more than was strictly prudent about his criteria for historical inquiry. Concluding the debate, Freedman wrote:
Our concern is not, as Pilger seems to think, to obscure his thesis by 'smearing' it, but to point out that it has no factual basis. Perhaps we are being mundane, but we simply think that those engaging in the nuclear debate, on either side, should show respect for the evidence and for the audience. Pilger has not done so. We are pleased that his friends have sent him 'studies and sources'; we hope he now uses them.
Pilger is well known for the extravagance of his rhetoric and his emotive presentation. But these are less serious deficiencies than the way he treats historical sources. Perhaps it is because he believes so strongly in the notion of official deceit that Pilger disregards historical inquiry when forcing his prespecified conclusions. But whatever the reason, that's what he does, and that's what deprives his work of any redeeming characteristic.