Talks and al-Qaeda

Tony Blair's former aide Jonathan Powell has a new book out, which will be serialised next week in The Guardian. The newspaper gives a taster today of Powell's conclusions. Not all are counterintuitive, and especially not this one: "He said that Labour's first term in office had also been hampered by the poor calibre of many ministers, including the health secretary Frank Dobson, whom he described as 'a disaster', and the environment minister Michael Meacher." (I was a constituent of Dobbo's in Holborn & St Pancras. He was useless and idle at anything he set his mind to.) But The Guardian is right to lead on this, which is more surprising:

"Western governments must talk to terror groups including al-Qaida and the Taliban if they hope to secure a long-term halt to their campaigns of violence, according to the man who for more than a decade was Tony Blair's most influential aide and adviser. Jonathan Powell, who served as Blair's chief of staff from 1995 to 2007 and is widely regarded as having been instrumental in negotiating a settlement in Northern Ireland, said his experience in the province convinced him that it was essential to keep a line of communication open even with one's most bitter enemies.

"Powell said: 'There's nothing to say to al-Qaida and they've got nothing to say to us at the moment, but at some stage you're going to have to come to a political solution as well as a security solution. And that means you need the ability to talk.'"

He's not calling for talks with al-Qaeda (as the late Mo Mowlam absurdly did), and rightly perceives that the organisation stands for something other than negotiable political demands. But his view is still terribly mistaken. I went on Radio 4's PM programme this afternoon to argue the point with Gabrielle Rifkind, a psychotherapist and specialist in conflict resolution with the Oxford Research Group and the Conflicts Forum. Our debate is here (till Monday's PM replaces it); we're on about 15 minutes into the programme.

For me, the single most interesting part of the discussion was Ms Rifkind's final comment (she rightly had the last word, as I had had the first, so I wasn't able to remark on this in the programme). I had cited the successes of General Petraeus in inflicting huge damage on the morale and operational effectiveness of al-Qaeda in Iraq. The task that General Petraeus had set himself was to establish security as a prerequisite to political progress. (I had the privilege of meeting General Petraeus and listening to him expound his strategy immediately before he took up his post.) He and his forces have turned a war that our side was losing into one that is winnable, by securing Sunni support and isolating al-Qaeda. With greater opportunism than logic, Ms Rifkind apparently wishes to cite this experience as an argument in favour of her case.

I'm unfazed - but the gains in Iraq are not an instance of "conflict resolution". They are the outcome of effective counterinsurgency, planned and implemented by a remarkable military mind. It's crucial to Iraq and to western security that there be no resolution of our conflict with al-Qaeda. They declared war on us; their principles and not only their methods are barbarous; the conflict will end with their defeat. If the critics of Anglo-American strategy are now trying to claim our successes in the struggle as vindication, then that may be significant and is certainly pleasing.

Comments

[Joshua Collison]

"They declared war on us; their principles and not only their methods are barbarous; the conflict will end with their defeat."
Only if you believe you can kill a virus with a bullet does this make sense. Surely you, as a left-winger, are familiar with the strengths of movements which have no rigid structure, no central command but a shared ideology? This can also be percieved as a weakness, correctly so, as a lack of communication means a repetition of activities can occur, not pooling the skills of the whole into a coherent movement but each "cell" acting independently of the others without knowledge of their activities.
It can be seen as a strength because it is impossible to destroy entirely, kill one cell and another will appear in it`s place. "The Israelis come here and kill four `terrorists` and think that there will be four less, but the anger at their actions created twenty more". The sentiment is clear and oft repeated. Even if you kill all the "cells" at once, the ideology remains and will breed more hatred and more terrorists.
Nobody in their right mind would disagree that al-Qaeda and other terrorists need to be defeated, but the cure that you and others prescribe will only lead to a multiplication of terrorist activities.

[Tim Newman]

The sentiment is clear and oft repeated. Even if you kill all the "cells" at once, the ideology remains and will breed more hatred and more terrorists.

This is true, which is why the aims of the war on terror do not appear to be a reduction in the number of terrorists, but a reduction in the effectiveness of those terrorists which happen to be out there regardless of their numbers. The Israelis would probably recognise this approach, as it is one they have taken with the construction of their security fence.

[Kellie Strøm]

If there is no central command to destroy, then neither is there a central command to negotiate with. Or did I miss something?

[Gorilla Bananas]

The sentiment is clear and oft repeated. Even if you kill all the "cells" at once, the ideology remains and will breed more hatred and more terrorists.

The point you overlook is that a belief in ultimate victory is an essential part of their ideology. They believe they are doing God's will. This belief will not withstand an indefinite number of failures.

[Barry Meislin]

Masters of providing a plethora of alternatives, none of them good, they can then abuse you for choosing, or not choosing, any one alternative over the other.

Even better, the West (or elements in it), in its piety, desire to "resolve issues," and righteous indignation (born of a combination of ideological certainty and large doses of inevitable frustration), will choose to abuse itself, even as it focuses its ire on the collective Emanuel Goldstein of the moment.

What is known in some circles as a "win-win" situation.

[Putzi]

No surrender to the al-Qaeda! No talking, no negotiations, no compromise, no, no, NO!

Instead, we'll fight them to the last man!!

Something tells me that the Rev Ian Paisley (circa 1965) would have very strongly agreed with you, Oliver. (And you with him...?)

[Joshua Collison]

"...a belief in ultimate victory is an essential part of their ideology. They believe they are doing God's will. This belief will not withstand an indefinite number of failures."
Are you talking about Bush and company or al-qaeda? Because the first two lines are true of both. As for the last line, neither side seems at all put off by their miriad of failures. The west is no closer to defeating terrorism (arguably it is further away since the GWOT started) and al-qaeda is no closer to it`s goal.

[Joshua Collison]

"If there is no central command to destroy, then neither is there a central command to negotiate with. Or did I miss something?"
If the US or Britain want to communicate with
al-Qaeda, they simply have to release a statement to the press and it will travel the world over.

[Danel]

If the US or Britain want to communicate with al-Qaeda, they simply have to release a statement to the press and it will travel the world over.

That's not negotiation! An important part of negotiation is give and take - we'll stop doing this if you'll stop doing that - and there isn't a central command of al-Qaeda that can help with this.

Moreover, we can't give them a lot of what they want. There are perhaps one or two elements that we might be able to, but these are far from the centre of their aims, and in combination with the previous lack of a central command makes it untenable - I remember the way that negotiations in Ireland saw many splinter groups who disagreed with some new compromise - al-Qaeda comes pre-splintered.

[Gorilla Bananas]

The west is no closer to defeating terrorism (arguably it is further away since the GWOT started) and al-qaeda is no closer to it`s goal.

Al Qaeda is further from its goal. It has lost Afghanistan, the only state that was willing to host it. It has failed to carry out a single further attack on American soil. How do you know the West is no closer to defeating terrorism, given that this is likely to be a decades long conflict? How does one even judge progress? This isn't a basketball match in which you can look at a scoreboard.

[Joshua Collison]

" It has failed to carry out a single further attack on American soil"
If the goal of the war on terror is to prevent attacks on American soil, then it can be judged a success so far. However, terrorist atrocities in the rest of the world have increased dramatically.

[Barry Larking]

I found Kamm's analysis as usual commendable. Space restricts what one may comment upon here, but I think one point should be made. Regime change is not necessarily a right wing policy of imperial conquest. Strangely on the left there has been a free market approach to foreign affairs; for too long it was seen as a badge of honour on the left to be 'reaching out' to countries with appalling regimes provided they were sufficiently anti-western and especially anti-American. Providing the regime was obnoxious enough towards the west an accommodation was necessary. Compare and contrast left attitudes towards say Chile and Vietnam in the same period.

This remarkably ungrown up direction of left thinking on foreign policy was halted by Tony Blair, which why I still admire him.